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This paper examines the need for, and feasibility of, India considering a combination of
regional initiatives in Asia to overcome the constraints impeding the development of its
bond markets.
While the robust growth in the equity markets has caught the attention of the
internationally-mobile investor, the Indian bond markets still have a long way to go. Since
the 1990s, the Indian government has laid the infrastructural, componential, and techno-
logical framework for building its bond markets, but the lack of a critical pool of "issuers"
and "investors" remains a serious inhibitor of any further development. This not only de-
prives the Indian financial system of a "spare tire,"' but also of an alternate avenue for
financing its colossal infrastructure over the next decade.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 acutely highlighted the importance of deep and
liquid bond markets as an alternative channel of financial intermediation. Domestic banks,
whose assets were in long-term local currency, faltered when their short-term dollar bor-
rowings came under external pressures. With no viable local bond markets to turn to, the
ensuing banking crisis resulted in a string of corporate insolvencies. India did well to survive
the contagion by controlling its external debt and staggering the Indian Rupee float over a
period of time. Now, as India integrates globally and as the Indian Rupee is fully convertible
on the current account and partially, but increasingly, convertible on the capital account, it
cannot possibly remain immune to any shake-out in the international financial markets and
needs to assiduously build its bond markets to back up the banking system.
The financing requirements to develop the vast infrastructure of roads, ports, power,
telecom, water, irrigation, railways, and the like are estimated to be in the region of US
$350 billion2 over the next decade. While this estimate may vary from time to time, the
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1. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks before the 1999 Financial Markets Conference
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia, Do Efficient Financial Markets Mitigate Financial
Crises? (Oct. 19, 1999), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991019.htm.
2. FEDERATION OF INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY, FICCI'S ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
FIvE YEARS 29 (Feb. 2004), http://ficci.com/ficci/general/new-addiion/eco-agenda.pdf.
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Indian government has admitted that the development of the infrastructure is beyond its
budgetary resources. India's lagging infrastructure is cited as a key impediment to its tryst
with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies of 2050.1 As long-term lending
by commercial banks shrinks and domestic development financial institutions struggle to
stay afloat, the infrastructure sector is heading for a financial crunch unless India quickly
moves the needle on its bond markets.
Against this backdrop, part II presents the factors favoring the development of bond
markets as a crucial supplement to bank financing; part III is a contextual discussion on the
size and depth of the Indian bond market and the two fundamental impediments to its
further development; part V explores the feasibility of India's joining the Asian Bond Fund
and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative as a viable regional solution to overcome its funda-
mental bond market limitations; and part V concludes.
II. Bond Markets vs. Bank Financing
Before reviewing the specific factors in India that favor the growth of bond markets, it
would be useful to briefly summarize, as a matter of background, the general importance
of bond markets in an economy and take a look at the respective shares of, and comparative
international trends in, banking and bond markets as a source of finance.
A. BACKGROUND: IMPORTANCE OF BOND MARKETS
Very broadly, the raisons d'etre for efficient bond markets can be set out as follows:
1. Developed bond markets provide critical pricing information for financing decisions
in an economy-a market determined term structure of interest rates that reflect the
opportunity cost of funds at a wide range of maturities. An active market in govern-
ment securities and a benchmark yield curve enable the development of new financial
products that not only provide tools for risk management but also facilitate operation
of monetary policy by the central bank and liquidity management by financial
institutions.
2. Bond markets are a source of long-term capital for the infrastructure sector. Relative
to the bank market, bond markets offer advantages in longer maturities, tradability,
and repayment structures. Long-term bonds issued by participants in the infrastruc-
ture sector enable institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension
funds, to generate stable long-term cash flows to match their long-term liabilities.
3. Bond markets help prevent the concentration of financial intermediation in banks and
also provide diversification and spreading of risk between capital markets and the
banking system. Over-reliance on banks to provide investment financing leaves the
economy vulnerable to credit crunches. The bond markets, therefore, offer resilience
to a country's financial system against external shocks and contagion. As Alan Green-
span, Chairman, U.S. Federal Reserve, notes:
3. See DOMINIC WILSON & RoOPA PtIRUSHOTHAMAN, DREAMING WITH BRICs: THE PATH TO 2050 (Oct. 1,
2003), http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf. BRIC economies-Brazil, Russia, India, and China
together could be larger than the G6 in terms of U.S. dollars. By 2025 they could account for over half the
size of the G6. Of the current G6, only the United States and Japan may be among the six largest economies
in terms of U.S. dollars in 2050.
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When American banks stopped lending in 1990, as a consequence of a collapse in the value of
real estate collateral, the capital markets were able to substitute for the loss of bank financial
intermediation. Interestingly, the then recently developed mortgage-backed securities market
kept residential mortgage credit flowing, which in prior years would have contracted sharply.
Arguably, without the capital market backing, the mild recession of 1991 could have been far
more severe.
4
Bond markets also generate competition in the financial services industry by lowering the
transaction costs and compelling banks to constantly innovate and remain competitive.
B. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN BANKING Vs. BOND MARKETS
On a global basis, while the share of bond financing has grown from 32 percent in 1997
to 56 percent of the total international consolidated lending in 2003, banks are still the
dominant source of finance for infrastructure projects, contributing 69.8 percent of the
total global lending on infrastructure in 2003 (though declining from a high of 89 percent
in 1997).
Total Global International Bank Lending and Bond Issuance (1993-2003)
(US $ Billions)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Bank 548 812 1154 1325 1601 1336 1507 1910 1574 1554 1489
Lending of 89 129 221 261 335 277 377 553 385 347 296
which to
Infrastructure
Total Bond 499 457 496 713 757 912 1379 1469 1716 1500 1912
Issuance of 40 29 28 39 41 65 150 157 201 103 128
which to
Infrastructure
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 20041
In developing countries, where bank and bond financing have alternated as a source of
finance, the average annual rate of growth in the stock of bond debt was 23 percent com-
pared to 2 percent in bank lending.6
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in Asia, structural changes occurred in the regional
pattern of borrowing. For example, international claims on East Asia and the Pacific de-
clined from US $233 billion in 1997 to US $152 billion in 2003.1 Japanese bank lending
in Asia fell by 72 percent between June 1997 and September 2003, and it now accounts for
just 17 percent of international claims on the region, compared with 40 percent in 1997. 8
4. See Greenspan, supra note 1.
5. THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: HARNESSING CYCLICAL GAINS FOR DEVELOPMENT
161 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GDFINT2004/Home/20177154/GDF-2004% 20
pdf.pdf.
6. Id. at 45.
7. Id. at 55.
8. Id.
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In 2003, bank lending in East Asia declined from 68 percent in 1997 to 61 percent of total
domestic financing, while bond financing accounted for 19 percent of total domestic fi-
nancing, up from 13 percent in 1997.9 The role of bonds in corporate finance also registered
a slight increase. In 1997, bank lending, which accounted for 71 percent of the total cor-
porate finance, dropped to 66 percent in 2003.10 On the other hand, the share of bond
financing in corporate finance moved up from 8 percent in 1997 to 11 percent in 2003.11
Bank vs. Bond as a percentage of total domestic financing
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China (PRC) Bank 75 74 71 63 66 71 72
Bond 9 11 12 12 13 13 13
Indonesia Bank 71 76 47 54 56 55 50
Bond - - 22 30 29 29 27
Korea Bank 69 63 53 58 55 56 51
Bond 23 25 22 27 27 28 29
Malaysia Bank 48 46 39 43 42 43 40
Bond 20 21 20 23 24 23 23
Singapore Bank 36 40 26 29 34 33 28
Bond 12 14 11 15 20 24 21
Thailand Bank 85 80 68 72 67 64 51
Bond 4 8 12 15 17 19 16
Source: Asia Development Bank, Asia Bond Monitor November 200412
Turbulence experienced by developing countries in the international financial markets
has hastened the development of local bond markets and regional bond initiatives. Even
though the pace of growth in bond markets varies from country to country, the trend is
clear-bank lending, though still dominant, is on the decline as understanding of the merits
of a diversified financial system takes root in various countries.
C. INDIA: FACTORS FAVORING BOND MARKET DEVELOPMENT
While India has been a predominantly bank-oriented system similar to other emerging
markets, various factors are fueling the urgency to develop India's bond markets as an
alternative source of debt capital.
1. Policy Intent
Learning from international experiences in market-based economies and from financial
crises around the world, the Indian government's stated policy is to lean toward develop-
ment of an integrated and diversified financial system. The basic tenets of this policy were
nicely echoed by Ms. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund, at the Bankers' Conference in New Delhi on November 10, 2004:
9. Asian Development Bank, Asia Bond Monitor 2004, Nov. 2004, at 17, http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/
documents/abm-nov2004.pdf [hereinafter Asia Bond Monitor 2004].
10. Id. at 19.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The banking sector is crucial. But it should not be the only source of finance and credit
allocation. As an economy grows in size and complexity, the financial sector must grow with
it. It must become wider and deeper in order to spread risk. The more sources of finance, and
the more sources of credit-and the greater the competition-the better placed the sector is
to assess risk and potential rates of return. The more efficient credit allocation is, the more
likely it is that credit goes to where it will deliver the best return, so raising the potential
growth rate of the economy as a whole. The better risk assessment and management, the better
directed credit is, and the better-regulated the financial sector, the more resilient the economy
as a whole will be to external shocks. 3
In Asia,Japan is the flag-bearer for bank-oriented systems, where 89 percent of the supply
of funds is intermediated by banks and other private financial institutions, and only 11
percent is directly financed from the securities markets. 14 Historically, the Japanese pre-
ferred to make deposits rather than invest in capital markets, mainly because people chose
financial institutions located close to home or work. Further, banks were not only providers
of loan capital, but also of corporate governance through shareholding and board mem-
bership. With the bursting of the economic bubble in the 1990s came the realization that
factors which were responsible for success of post-war Japan were now out of sync with
and incapable of responding to the developments in international markets. Consequently,
Japan is now actively moving to diversify its debt markets.
2. Decline in Project Lending by the Indian Banking Sector
In recent years, India's predominantly government owned and controlled banking sector
has been busy cleaning up its balance sheet. Domestic banks, in order to avoid asset-liability
mismatches, are leaning toward working capital advances over long-term financing. To
facilitate compliance with capital adequacy norms, there is marked preference for risk-free
government securities, with domestic banks investing up to 41.3 percent of their net demand
and time liabilities therein-far in excess of the required Statutory Liquidity Ratio of 25
percent. 5 Furthermore, 40 percent of the net bank credit for domestic banks (32 percent
for foreign banks) is directed by the government to the priority sector.16 There has also
been a significant shrinkage in project lending by domestic Development Financial Insti-
tutions (DFIs). DFIs were set up to provide long-term finance for infrastructure and in-
dustrial sectors.' 7 With financial reforms cutting off their access to concessional funding,
DFIs are pulling back on project lending, preferring to lend on a short- to medium-term
basis. However, unable to compete with commercial banks, DFIs are now either converting
into or merging with them.
13. Anne Krueger, First Managing Deputy Director, International Monetary Fund, Keynote address before
Bankers Conference, New Delhi, India, Banking Needs of A Global Economy (Nov. 10, 2004), http://
www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2004/l 11004.htm.
14. ROCHELLE Kopp, ECONOMIC IssuEs IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 12, 60 (2000).
15. See RESERvE BANK OF INDIA, ANUAL POLICY STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR 2005-2006 7 (2005), http://
www.business-standard.com/general/pdf/280405credit.pdf.
16. Government of India: Ministry of Finance, Union Budget & Economic Survey: Economic Survey 2004-
2005, at 65, http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2004-05/chapt2005/chap36.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) [herein-
after India Economic Survey].
17. See generally R.H. Patil, Broadbasing and Deepening the Bond Market (The Wharton Financial Institutions
Center, Working Paper No. 01-32, 2001), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0132.pdf.
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3. Weakness in the Banking System
a. Non-Performing Advances (NPAs)
The issue of mounting NPAs over the past decade has been threatening the viability of
the Indian banking system. The consolidated NPAs of all the banks in India (public, private,
and foreign banks) amounted to Re 708 billion (approximately US $16 billion) in 2001-02
constituting 10.4 percent of their gross advances (5.5 percent on net basis). 8 While frantic
corporate debt restructuring, rescheduling of loans, settlements, recoveries through debt
tribunals, and the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest Act of 2002 19 have assisted in bringing down gross NPAs to 7.2 percent
in 2003 -04 (2.9 percent on net basis), the current gross figure of Re 647 billion (US $14
billion) is still staggering. 20 It has been suggested that one way to limit the growth of NPAs
is to slow the growth of bank deposits by encouraging households to shift their savings into
capital market instruments.
b. Other Concerns
Indian banks still need to implement advanced risk management techniques and credit
information and assessment systems. They are also handicapped by relatively high operating
costs, poor rate of technological absorption (particularly in public sector banks), weak in-
ternal control systems, overstaffing, and lack of training and education-all of which not
only lowers the operational efficiency but also significantly impairs their ability to meet the
obligations of Basle.
4. Privatization
In India, privatization has twofold implications: (1) partial equity disinvestments by
government-owned companies to raise budgetary resources with or without sharing control
and (2) private participation in the ownership/management/operation of utility and social
infrastructure, which had traditionally been owned/managed/operated and subsidized by
the government. Taking (2) forward, Mr. P. Chidambaram in his budget speech to the Indian
Parliament on February 28, 2005, stated that,
[flrom a policy perspective, there is now a widespread consensus that direct government pro-
duction of all infrastructure services introduces difficulties concerning technical efficiency,
adequate scale of investment, proper enforcement of user charges, and competitive market
structure. At the same time, a pure reliance on private production in an unregulated market is
not likely to produce sound outcomes. India has been actively engaged in finding the appro-
priate policy framework, which gives, private sector adequate confidence and incentives to
invest on massive scale but simultaneously preserves adequate checks and balances through
transparency, competition and regulation.2'
In developing countries, annual investment commitments for infrastructure projects with
private participation grew strongly from US $18 billion in 1990 to US $128 billion in
18. See India Economic Survey, supra note 16, at 62.
19. This Act enabled the financial institutions to foreclose and enforce their security interest directly, with
due notice, but without involvement of the courts.
20. See Government of India: Ministry of Finance, Union Budget & Economic Survey: Budget 2005-2006,
http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2005-06/ubmain.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
21. India Economic Survey, supra note 16.
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1997.22 Despite a sharp decline in investment to US $58 billion in 2001 due to the impact
of various financial crises in the developing countries, private participation accounted for a
significant 25 percent share of the total investment in infrastructure from 1990-2001.23
Closer to home, cumulative investment in infrastructure projects with private participation
in India during the period of 1990-2001 was US $27.7 billion compared to US $53.8 billion
in China, US $36.6 billion in Malaysia, US $33.2 billion in Korea, US $28.9 billion in
Indonesia, and US $23.9 billion in Thailand.24 The burden of financing infrastructure is
increasingly passing from the public sector to the private sector, which in turn will largely
depend on bond markets for its long-term financing needs.
5. Securitization
The early securitization deals entered into by Citibank and ICICI and the subsequent
passing of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act of 2002, which, among other things, set out a framework for securi-
tization in India, have provided impetus to the number of securitization transactions.25 India
now ranks third, after Japan and Korea, in the securitization activity in Asia, though it is
still small in actual quantum of amounts securitized. Lack of deep bond markets and a small
investor base has led to most transactions being either privately placed or amounting to
bilateral portfolio buyouts.
In summary, positive factors (government intent, privatization, securitization) and neg-
ative factors (weaknesses in the banking system) are all unrelenting in their push for de-
velopment of an alternate and viable source of raising debt. Further, with the traditional
sources of financing drying up, the infrastructure sector is heading for a serious resource
crunch unless India can rapidly develop its bond markets as a viable alternative.
I. Fundamental Impediments: Lack of Issuers and
Investors
India's US $2 50 billion plus bond market is the fourth largest in Asia after Japan, South
Korea, and China. The size notwithstanding, serious limitations are apparent in the Indian
bond markets that impair its ability to provide a back up to the banking system and support
the demands of the infrastructure sector. These limitations or fundamental impediments
can be better understood after a brief comparative overview of the Indian bond market.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE INDIAN BOND MARKET
The bond markets in India are comprised of mainly two segments: the government se-
curities market and the corporate securities market. The government securities market is
predominant in outstanding issues, market capitalization, and trading value and is reason-
22. Ada Karina Izaguirre, Private Infrastructure: A Review of Projects with Private Participation 1990-2001, in
THE WORLD BANK GROUP PRIVATE SECTOR AND INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK NOTE No. 250 (Oct. 2002),available
at http://ppi.worldbank.org/ppi2/book/2 50izagu-101502.pdf.
23. Id.
24. See The World Bank Group, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, http://ppi.worldbank.org
(last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
25. See generally, Lakshmi Mohandas, Securitisation, in BOMBAY STOCK EXCHANGE ANNUAL CAPITAl. MARKET
REVIEW '03 (2003), http://www.bseindia.com/downloads/Securitisation.pdf.
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ably well developed, while the corporate securities market-following the sequential
growth pattern experienced in other countries-is still in its infancy.
During 2003-04, the government and corporate sector collectively mobilized Re
2,509,089 million (US $56 billion) from the primary debt market, of which approximately
79 percent was raised by the government (both central and state governments). 2 The re-
maining 21 percent mobilization from the debt market was by the corporate sector-con-
sisting of private corporates, public sector units, and domestic financial institutions. Inter-
estingly, the net borrowings of the central government financed 75.6 percent of the gross
"fiscal deficit" of the central government.27 A major part of the corporate debt was on private
placement basis.2 s
In the secondary market, the aggregate transactions in all debt securities increased by
36.6 percent in 2003-04, but the corporate/non-government securities accounted for only
1.6 percent of total turnover in debt market.29
Debt Market (in Re million)
Amount raised from Turnover in
Primary Market Secondary Market
Issuer/Securities 2002-03 2003-04 2002-03 2003-04
Government 1,819,790 1,981,570 19,557,313 26,792,084
Corporate/Non-Government 531,166 527,519 360,387 422,622
Total 2,350,956 2,509,089 19,917,700 27,214,706
Source: National Stock Exchange of India, Securities Market Review 200430
The total market capitalization of securities available for trading in the wholesale debt
segment of the National Stock Exchange (retail being negligible) stood at Re 12,158,638
million (US $270 billion) at the end of March 2004, and registered a growth of 40.64
percent over end-March 2003. 31 At the same time, government securities accounted for
78.9 percent of total market capitalization.3 2 Clearly, at the moment the Indian bond market
is synonymous with the government bond market, with the privately-placed corporate bond
market microscopic in terms of size, depth, and liquidity.
B. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Notwithstanding relatively high capitalization, a comparison within Asia, in a sample of
eight countries, shows that Indian bond markets standing at 32.8 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) (at market rate), are one of the smallest relative to its GDP, that
26. NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE OF INDIA LIMITED, INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET: A REVIEW VOL. VIII (2004),
at 139, http://www.nseindia.com/archives/us/ismr/us-ismr2004.htm [hereinafter INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET
REVIEW].
27. Id.
28. Id. at 150.
29. Id. at 160.
30. Id. at 139.
31. Id. at 167.
32. See id.
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is just marginally higher than China and Indonesia.33 While it has registered an impressive
growth of 27.2 percent (between 2002 and September 2004), the highest in the sample, an
overwhelming portion of that has come from the growth in the government bond market,
which has largely been funding the fiscal deficit of the government. 4 The government bond
market led market growth in most countries (except South Korea). The corporate bond
markets, though small on average, with India being the smallest, were growing steadily in
the region.
Domestic Debt Securities (US $billion)-Amounts Outstanding
GDP 2003 Debt/GDP %






























































































































33. See The International Banking Market, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, Sept. 2005, at A96-97, available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r-qa0509.pdf#page = 96.
34. Id.; INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET REVIEW, supra note 26, at 158-59.
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Thailand 47.3 56.8 60.2 143.0 39.7
Govt. 28.9 30.7 34.5
FI 3.0 6.8 7.2
Corporate 15.3 19.3 18.4
Source: BIS Quarterly Review September 2005"
Overall, national bond markets in developing countries have doubled in size since 1993
from 18 percent to 36 percent of the GDP (2003).16 In a wider context, this is still well
below the average of 120 percent of the GDP in developed countries." In fact, the total
local currency bonds outstanding worldwide stood at US $40 trillion at the end of 2003,
with the United States accounting for 44 percent and the European Union 15 for 26
percent."
C. FUNDAMENTAL IMPEDIMENTS
A range of structural and operational changes has been introduced in India over the past
decade in the government securities market. In the primary market, diversified debt secu-
rities-zero coupon bonds, floating rate bonds, and capital index bonds-are issued
through the auction system at market-related rates across maturities to develop a benchmark
yield curve. To build the secondary market, a system of primary dealers was set up to provide
two-way quotes for the transactions. The Negotiated Dealing System was introduced to
facilitate screen-based negotiated dealing for secondary market transactions in government
securities, money market instruments, online reporting of transactions, and dissemination
of trade information to the members." The Clearing Corporation of India was established
to facilitate settlements using the higher versions of Delivery vs. Payment mechanism and
to act as a central counterparty for clearing and settlement of securities transactions.40 The
Real Time Gross Settlement System has now been introduced to reduce settlement risks
and costs.41 Active credit rating agencies have been woven into the regulatory framework.
Other regulatory measures, such as abolition of withholding tax and stamp duty on transfer
of dematerialized debt securities, have also been taken to build the debt market.
While the Indian government is constantly reviewing a slew of additional measures, such
as amending the legislative framework, developing transparency, and disseminating infor-
mation to full market on a real time basis, which would increase liquidity through short
selling, the government needs to recognize two fundamental impediments: (1) lack of debt
issuers and (2) lack of investors.
1. Lack of Debt Issuers
As discussed earlier, the dominant issuer in the Indian bond market is the central gov-
ernment. In the recent past, a few local bodies, such as municipal agencies, have also tapped
35. See The International Banking Market, supra note 33 at A96-A97.
36. See generally THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Robert Litan et
al. eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2003).
37. Id.
38. See Asia Bond Monitor 2004, supra note 9.
39. INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET REVIEW, supra note 26, at 18.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 139.
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the market; but the municipal-bond market has not taken off due to lack of transparency,
creditworthiness, and political inertia. Bonds issued by government-sponsored institutions
like DFIs, banks, and public sector units did not raise many funds from the bond market.
Corporate bond markets saw some structured bond products being issued but were under-
taken overwhelmingly on a private placement basis.
Security-wise Distribution of Turnover
% of Turnover
Securities 2002-03 2003-04
Government Securities 93.62 92.60
T-Bills 3.02 4.23
PSU Bonds 1.37 1.21
Institutional Bonds 0.50 0.85
Bank Bonds & Cert. of Deposit (short term paper) 0.28 0.33
Corporate Bonds & Commercial Paper 1.21 0.78
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: National Stock Exchange of India, Securities Market Review 20044
Hesitation in the Indian corporate sector to tap the bond markets stem from the fact that
most Indian companies have yet to mature from family setups to widely held corporations.
Floating debt or equity is still perceived as ceding control, making the company vulnerable
to interference by outsider investors. Public disclosure of information otherwise closely
held is poor, which does not support the public issue of corporate debt. When undertaken,
the disclosure requirements of public issuance are evaded by relying on the private place-
ment route. Additionally, the legal, accounting, reporting, and transactional costs of raising
funds from the bond market are significant compared to the ease of access to bank funding.
It is notable that the securities regulator in India has in 2004 made it mandatory for any
listed company issuing debt securities on a private placement basis to comply with disclosure
requirements under stipulated terms and conditions. Subsidiaries of multinational compa-
nies in India, given the thin and illiquid corporate securities market, also by-and-large prefer
to rely on domestic banks (through commercial borrowing or privately placed bonds) or
raise short-term debt from their parent companies overseas.
While it can be argued that corporate bond markets traditionally have been underde-
veloped in most emerging markets, reflecting dominance of bank lending, it is alarming
that the share of corporate debt securities of the total debt outstanding in India was an
abysmal 0.96 percent as of the end of year 2003, compared to 2.8 percent in China, 4.7
percent in Indonesia, 9.8 percent in Japan, 45.5 percent in Malaysia, 9 percent in Singapore,
37.6 percent in South Korea, and 33.9 percent in Thailand.43
Additionally, under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act of 2003, the
government is required to reduce its fiscal deficit, financed largely by borrowings in the
government securities market." A reduction in the market borrowing program of the gov-
42. Id. at 164.
43. Id. at 4.
44. India Economic Survey, supra note 16, at 36.
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ernment could dampen the government securities market as well, unless steps are taken to
remove obstacles in the development of a municipal-bond market (e.g., the United States
and Japan), which the municipal agencies can tap for infrastructural and other services.
Notably, multilateral development financial institutions are now displaying interest in the
domestic Indian Rupee bond market. Asian Development Bank (ADB) mobilized Re 5
billion (over US $100 million) in the year 2004. It was the first supranational issue by a
foreign entity in India to be listed on the National Stock Exchange and set a benchmark
in documentation, disclosure, clearing and settlement, and pricing. ADB plans to actively
undertake interest rate swap transactions, which in turn will provide greater liquidity in the
swap market and enhance the efficiency of the bond market.
4
2. Narrow Investor Base
A narrow investor base impedes liquidity and development of secondary bond market in
the government, but, more particularly, in corporate debt securities. Banks (Indian, foreign,
and investment banks) were clearly the largest participants (collectively at 60 percent) in
the debt market, but participation by financial institutions, mutual funds, and corporates
was a measly 4.56 percent.46 Most mutual funds are invested and traded in government
securities through specialized gilt and liquid funds. While foreign institutional investors are
permitted to invest in treasury and corporate bonds, within certain limits, they were con-
spicuous in their near absence in the bond markets (as compared to their bullish activity in
the equity markets). 47
Participant-wise % Distribution of Turnover in Wholesale Debt Segment
Participants 2002-03 2003-04
Indian Banks 38.77 36.36
Foreign Banks 10.62 7.25
Primary Dealers (Investment Banks) 22.03 17.03
Trading Members 24.81 34.80
FI, Mutual Funds and Corporates 3.77 4.56
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: National Stock Exchange of India, Securities Market Review 200448
On the other hand, ADB's Indian Rupee bond issue in 2004 achieved a broad distribu-
tion-up to 60 percent of the bonds were placed with banks, 21 percent with insurance
companies, and 19 percent with mutual funds49-suggesting that some potential investors
stay dormant in the bond market due to lower quality of debt issues, poor disclosure, and
lack of transparency in pricing.
Contractual savings institutions-pension funds and provident funds-and insurance
companies, which have a voracious appetite for long term debt and are the largest investors
45. Press Release, Asian Development Bank, ADB Issues Indian Rupee Bonds (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.adb.org/documents/news/2004/nr 20 04O17.asp [hereinafter ADB Press Release].
46. INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET REVIEW, supra note 26, at 167.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. ADB Press Release, supra note 45.
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in debt segment in developed markets, are yet to make their presence felt in the Indian
debt market. Investments by provident funds owned by the government and the
government-dominated insurance sector are restricted due to directed fund deployment
rules of the government. It will take some time before the private pension funds envisaged
pursuant to the ongoing pension reforms make their presence felt.
At the retail level, interestingly, in 2002-03 the household sector invested 85.6 percent
of its gross domestic savings into fixed income instruments-41.5 percent bank deposits,
29.8 percent insurance/provident funds, 14.3 percent small savings, 5.9 percent securities
(4.3 percent of which has been government securities)-and 8.5% in currency instru-
ments.50 Thus, fixed- income bearing instruments are the most preferred assets of the Indian
household sector, evidencing huge untapped potential for the bond market, unlike other
emerging markets where the culture of diversifying fixed income investments is often lack-
ing among households. The government is considering the possible introduction of Sepa-
rate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS), under which the
underlying security can be converted into multiple zero-coupon securities tradable sepa-
rately to attract the retail investors and also to provide liquidity to issuers of long-term
debt.5' In order to further widen the retail investor base for government securities, non-
competitive bids from retail investors are now accepted.
In the Association for Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia, since the 1997
crisis, there has been a shift away from bank holdings toward more contractual savings
institutions and retail investment in government bonds. As explained in the ADB's Asian
Bond Monitor 2004,
[t]he most significant shift was in Thailand, where commercial banks' holding of government
bonds fell from about 55 [percent] of outstanding bonds in 1997 to 30 [percent] at the end of
2003. In Indonesia, government bond holdings by banks fell from over 97 [percent] in 2001
to about 83 [percent] in 2003. Moreover, contractual savings institutions, such as pension and
mutual funds, have become significant investors in Indonesian government bonds, rising from
1.4 [percent] in 2001 to 15.3 [percent] in 2003.2
Consistently across Asia (except Japan), banks hold over half of the local currency bonds,
compared to 11 percent in the United States, 35 percent in Japan, and 42 percent in Ger-
many. 3 The high proportion of government bonds held by banks in the Asian economies
is partly attributable to statutory requirements in those countries.
Therefore, despite having made substantive progress in this area and building the bond
market infrastructure, India-with a small issuer and investor base-will be severely con-
fined to a thin and illiquid bond market. Such a market can neither back up the banking
system nor support the anticipated requirement of US$350 billion by the infrastructure
sector alone over the next decade, unless India gets on the fast track with some outward
thinking.54
50. See INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET REVIEW, supra note 26, at 7.
51. Id. at 174.
52. Asia Bond Monitor 2004, supra note 9, at 10-11.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Akin to the current "services sector" driven GDP growth (as opposed to manufacturing- sector led
growth).
FALL 2005
710 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
IV. Asian Bond Fund; Asian Bond Markets Initiative
In the past, arguably India has rightly adopted an "inward looking strategy"" to develop
its domestic debt market infrastructure, and directed investments to aid in that process. Its
conservative approach to capital account liberalization on the debt side, while opening up
the equity side, did indeed insulate it from the disturbances in the international financial
markets in the 1990s. Now, as India treads a high growth path and seeks to become a
regional player, it needs to develop an appropriate outward looking strategy that would
allow "international issuers" to raise debt in India and motivate "international investors" to
invest in local bond markets, while permitting local issuers to simultaneously raise debt
from bond markets abroad. India's participation in a combination of Asian region initiatives
could provide a strong stimulus in this direction.
A. BACKGROUND TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
In a mature Asian Bond Market scenario, Asian bonds are envisaged to be bonds issued
by various governments, corporations, and financial institutions in Asia to investors pref-
erably in Asia, denominated in Asian currencies, traded, and settled in Asian financial
centers.
The need to develop the Asian Bond market gathered momentum after the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis of 1997-98. Takatoshi Ito, Professor of Research Center for Advanced Science
and Technology, University of Tokyo, nicely provides the basis for this development:
First, it was found important to reduce vulnerability is to avoid the "double mismatch" problem,
namely currency and maturity mismatches of borrowers in emerging market companies. Bor-
row short in the US dollar and lend long in the local currency is dangerous. Second, to avoid
over-reliance on the banking sector is important, since the "twin crisis," that is, a simultaneous
currency and banking crisis, is quite damaging to the economy. Third, to avoid the dollar peg
is important both from the viewpoint of maintaining price competitiveness of imports and of
discouraging too much short-term capital inflows.
5 6
Currently, four regional forums provide the framework for regional financial coopera-
tion: Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD); Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Finance Min-
isters Meeting (APEC FMM); Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks
(EMEAP); and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and Korea
(ASEAN + 3). While these bodies carry varying mandates for bond market development in
Asia, the initiatives taken by EMEAP and ASEAN+ 3 as potential providers of demand-
and supply- side solutions to India's bond market problems are reviewed below.
B. EMEAP: ASIAN BOND FUNDS
In June 2003, the first US $1 billion Asian Bond Fund was announced by EMEAP mem-
bers, consisting of central banks of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It was funded by the
foreign exchange reserves of EMEAP members with the objective of investing in dollar-
55. See generally Litan, supra note 36.
56. Takatoshi Ito, Paper Presented at the PECCAsia Bond Conference in Hua Hin, Thailand (July 8, 2003),
at 2, http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jpttito/Seisaku/PECCAsiaBond.pdf.
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denominated bonds issued by the eight Asian governments/quasi governments of EMEAP
(excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand).1 The fund's primary purpose is to diversify
and invest a small portion of Asian reserves, traditionally saved in Europe and the United
States, for better returns within Asia. This was largely recognized as a good first step.
The second Asian Bond Fund, announced by EMEAP in December 2004, is aimed at
investments in local currency bonds of governments/quasi-governments in eight EMEAP
members-Thailand, China, Indonesia, Philippine, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and
Malaysia." It is intended that in phase II this fund will be open to investment by non-
EMEAP public and private sector investors as well. The second Asian Bond Fund is ex-
pected to raise investor awareness and interest in Asian bonds by promoting innovative and
low cost products in Asia, enhance regional bond market infrastructure by introducing a
new set of transparent and credible bond indices, and accelerate regulatory reform at both
regional and domestic levels, eventually accruing to the benefit of potential issuers and
investors in the region.59
C. ASEAN+ 3: ASIAN BOND MARKETS INITIATIVE
The Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABAI) was undertaken by the Association of South-
east Nations (ASEAN)-consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam as well as the People's Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea-collec-
tively known as ASEAN+ 3. Announced in December 2002, ABMI had a broad regional
mandate to develop efficient and liquid bond markets across Asia, enabling better utilization
of Asian savings for Asian Investments and mitigating currency and maturity mismatches. 6°
Fundamental to ABMI is the reliance on a private-sector-led economic growth model,
where the private sector has a supply of stable, long-term capital through well-developed
bond markets that have access to a wider (regional) range of issuers, investors, and products,
and to mitigate currency and maturity mismatch in its financing. Also central to ABMI is
the belief that savings of the Asian region should be effectively utilized within the region
itself by developing both domestic markets in each country as well as the regional markets. 61
Consequently, ABMI focuses on bond issuance in the region by Asian governments (to
establish benchmarks), multilateral development banks, and government financial institu-
tions. It encourages bond issuance to finance foreign direct investment in the region and
issuance of asset-backed securities markets, including collateralized debt obligations. It is
also working on the following: expansion of local currency-denomination of bonds and the
introduction of a currency basket of bonds; construction of a regional guarantee and in-
vestment mechanism to cover credit risks on regional bond issuances; strengthening the
rating system by enhancing the role of domestic rating agencies, as well as considering the
57. Press Release, Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks, EMEAP Central Banks to Launch
Asian Bond Fund (June 2, 2003), available at http://www.emeap.org/press/02june03 .hon.
58. Press Release, Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks, EMEAP Central Banks Announce
the Launch of the Asian Bond Fund 2 (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.emeap.org/press/l6decO4.htm.
59. Id.
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possible establishment of an Asian Credit Rating Board; establishment of a mechanism for
disseminating information on issuers and credit rating agencies; addressing settlement issues
on cross-border transactions; and examining legal and institutional infrastructure.
62
Six working groups are progressing key areas for local currency bond market develop-
ment: (1) new securitized debt instruments; (2) credit guarantee and investment mecha-
nisms; (3) foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues; (4) issuance of bonds de-
nominated in local currencies by multilateral development banks, foreign government
agencies, and Asian multinational corporations; (5) rating systems and dissemination of
information on Asian bond markets; and (6) technical assistance coordination.6 3
ABMI has reported considerable progress on various fronts, such as (1) issuance of
Ringgit-denominated bonds by the ADB in Malaysia; (2) provision of credit guarantees by
Japan Bank for International Cooperation and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance
for bonds issued by Asian multinational companies; and (3) creation of a new scheme by
Korea and Japan for cross-country bond issuance collateralized and/or backed by bundling
of diverse underlying assets.64
ABMI is supplemental to, and cannot succeed without, each member country's contin-
uous efforts to develop its own domestic markets. ABMI, by providing a wider pool of
issuers, investors, and products, hastens the bond market development regionally and
nationally.
D. INDIA'S PARTICIPATION IN AsIAN BOND FUND AND ABMI
India's participation in the regional initiatives should be undertaken at two levels to
increase both the investor and issuer base.
1. EMEAP's Asian Bond Fund initiatives have been endorsed by the Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD), of which India is an active member. India could have the option of con-
tributing in phase 11 of the "second" Asian Bond Fund when it is opened up to non-EMEAP
members. ACD has also toyed with the idea of a new bond fund for its member countries.
India, with its burgeoning foreign exchange reserves (now in excess of US $140 billion),
can contribute generously to the corpus of the fund. The fund could then invest in Indian
Rupee bonds of the government and its agencies. Such a fund, as a lead investor, can catalyze
further investments by other international investors in the Indian bond markets.
2. India's joining the ABMI of ASEAN + 3 would lead to the mitigation or removal of
market and regulatory impediments, harmonization of rules and procedures, building of
infrastructure, and will facilitate: (a) Asian governments and multilateral aid agencies in
tapping the Indian bond market to meet their lending and aid commitments in India; (b)
international financial institutions and companies investing or doing business in India in
meeting their Indian Rupee requirements (and, at a later stage, depending on factors such
as the strength of its economy and the Indian Rupee, level of foreign exchange reserves,
the size of the foreign exchange market, and the liquidity in the bond market, the Indian
government can even permit international companies seeking efficient funding opportu-
nities to tap the local currency bond market); and finally (c) enable the Indian government
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Asian Development Bank, Progress Report of the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) (Nov. 2004), http://
asianbondsonline.adb.org/documents/Progress-Report-ABMI-Nov-2004.pdf.
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and its agencies and private companies to float bonds in a basket of Asian currencies, trad-
able in various markets including India. The presence of a wide variety of issuers and
investors will bring liquidity and efficiency and help build robust primary and secondary
bond markets both at the regional level and in India.
E. COMFORT FACTORS
The primary concerns in India of opening up the debt market to foreign investment on
a fully convertible basis are the credit risk and the potential large outflows of foreign ex-
change. Factors mentioned below will put this proposal in its political, economic, and reg-
ulatory perspective, which should alleviate the concerns.
1. India's gain would be a huge pool of investors and issuers that it sorely needs.
ASEAN + 3 is one of the largest cross-border investors in bond markets worldwide, holding
US $1.2 trillion, or 15 percent of global bonds outstanding as of December 2002.65 But, its
cross-border investments, for example, in East Asia were a mere US $18 billion, which is
about 1.5 percent in the year 2002.66 Clearly, a huge potential exists for moving Asian
savings into investment within the region and for India to tap.
2. India is externally financially healthy. Its foreign exchange reserves have now crossed
US $140 billion-a relatively healthy figure in the Asian region. 67 In fact, a proposal for
use of a portion of its reserves to fund infrastructure investment is now under consideration.
The foreign direct investment crossed US $5 billion in 2004 (it is reported that this figure
if computed as per the formula prescribed by International Monetary Fund amounts to US
$50 billion, close behind US $60 billion received by China in 2004).68 The cumulative
investment by foreign institutional investors touched US $25.75 billion by end March
2004.69 The total external debt amounted to US $111 billion, approximately 17.8 percent
of the GDP, and the short-term component was a safe US $4.7 billion, that is 4.3 percent
of the total external debt.70 Moreover, the share of government debt in total external debt
has come down from 60.1 percent in 1995 to 38.9 percent in 2004.71 As India liberalizes
increasingly on the capital account, it must continue to monitor closely the magnitude of
the external debt flows and its maturity profile.
3. The debt markets should be opened up to external flows in a phased manner. Asian
governments, multilateral development banks, and other international aid agencies, tapping
on a large scale the local currency bond market for meeting Indian Rupee commitments
(as ADB has already done), present minimal credit and foreign exchange risk, but in turn
provide diversification for local investors and attract international attention. Subsequently,
depending on India's macro-economic position, the local bond markets could also be
opened in a regulated manner for other international private investors, who would be in-
terested only if they can achieve favorable cross currency swap spreads. It may be pertinent
65. See Asia Bond Monitor 2004, supra note 9 at 15.
66. Id.
67. See Reserve Bank of India, Weekly Statistical Supplement, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/WSSView.
aspx?Id = 9242 (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
68. See India Economic Survey, supra note 16.
69. See INDIAN SECURITIES MARKET REVIEW, supra note 26, at 8.
70. See India Economic Survey, supra note 16, at 136.
71. Id. at 133.
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to add that the current regulatory environment is already quite liberal towards the outflow
of foreign exchange. For example, foreign institutional investors, non-resident Indian fi-
nancial institutions, and multilateral financial institutions are already permitted to invest in
dated government securities. Limits for Indian companies raising debt overseas are very
liberal-for example, Indian corporates can raise external debt up to US $500 million with
maturity of more than five years to finance investment in industrial, infrastructure, and for
acquisition of shares under the government's disinvestment program without any prior
approval of the Reserve Bank of India. In fact, during the period April-December 2004,
US $9.4 billion had been sanctioned collectively for External Commercial Borrowing and
Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds. 2
4. ASEAN+ 3 has emerged as India's dominant trading partner, accounting for 19.9
percent of India's total merchandise trade, followed by the European Union and North
America with shares of 19 percent and 12.9 percent in 2003 -04, respectively, reflecting the
current "look East" approach.73 Interestingly, in a recent survey conducted by the Federa-
tion of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry, Indian banks now look toward ASEAN
over any other area while considering overseas expansion to support the burgeoning busi-
ness requirements.
4
In light of the above, this proposal, a manifestation of increased capital account con-
vertibility, is both feasible and desirable. A suitable regulatory framework with a system of
prudential checks, balances, and guarantees can be implemented.
V. Conclusion
India has traditionally been a bank-dominated system, and a legitimate basis now exists
to be concerned about over-reliance on bank financing. The wisdom of diversifying financial
intermediation through development of bond markets was apparent after the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis of 1997-98. India has laid a good foundation by developing its government
securities market, but can now jump ahead only if it considers a regional solution in con-
junction with domestic development of its bond markets. Participation in a suitable Asian
Bond Fund and Asian Bond Markets Initiative will address the fundamental issues attrib-
utable to lack of issuers and investors in the system, catapult Indian bond markets to the
next level, and transform India into a strong regional player.
A caveat, however, to this proposal, is that to prevent financial intermediation from mov-
ing overseas, India needs to continue to strive to improve both the macroeconomic and
bond market environment. High inflation and fiscal deficits undermine the demand for
local currency paper. Further, the attractiveness of a market to investors depends upon the
quality of price discovery and information. India needs to work with ABMI to harmonize
rules, regulations, and accounting standards that are crucial to building this credibility. India
should look at strengthening its contract enforcement and insolvency structures. The in-
ternational perception that the Indian judiciary cannot deal with commercial claims in an
expeditious manner will also continue to deter investment in the bond market.
72. See India Economic Survey, supra note 16.
73. Sultan Shahin, India's "Look East" Policy Pays Off, AsIA TimEs, Oct. 11, 2003, available at http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/South-Asia/EJ11DfO5.html; See generally P. Chidambaram, Minister of Finance,
Speech on Union Budget 2005-2006 (Feb. 28, 2005), http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2005-06/bs/speecha.htm.
74. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, FICCI Survey on the Status of the Indian
Banking Industry, http://www.ficci.com/ficciimage/88888888-544/banking.pdf(last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
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P. Chidambaram, India's Finance Minister, in his Budget Speech to the Indian Parliament
on February 28, 2005, among other things, talked about his vision for the city of Mumbai
as a regional financial hub (midway between London and Tokyo), developing bond markets,
and setting up a special purpose vehicle for financing infrastructure. 5 The regional solution
proposed herein can well lead the way for India.
75. See Chidambaram, supra note 73.
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